Abstract: The UN System and the larger international community depend primarily on states to forge and enforce international agreements as well as to provide guarantees of basic human security and legal order internally. When states become fragile and are unable to meet the most basic responsibilities to their citizens and to the international community, those states run the risk of failure and even collapse. The Ad Hoc Working Group to Combat State Failure is being convened to analyze the immediate and root causes of state failure and to devise a series of feasible recommendations that states, international organizations, and civil society partners may implement to arrest and even reverse state failure.

Introduction

In the context of the United Nations System, a series of interlocking networks largely dominated by and ultimately responding to state actors, the concept of state failure is often described in apocryphal terms. Failed states are frequently labeled as havens for terrorists and breeding grounds for various forms of human insecurity, including armed conflict, the spread of highly infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and points of origin for refugee exoduses. Political scientists and policymakers have contrived a host of definitions for “failed states” and the delegates of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Combating State Failure could easily spend all of their time striving to define “failed states” comprehensively. To forestall that potential eventuality, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Combating State Failure will use the following definition as the basis for their discussions:

“a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.”

Using the above definition, delegates may wish to designate particular axes or indicators along which states exhibit conditions of state failure.

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Scale of the Problem

While the Ad Hoc Working Group will use the above definition for its deliberations, there is no assumption on the part of the FHSMUN Secretariat that all of the states represented in the Ad Hoc Working Group will necessarily agree on what constitutes a clear empirical example of a failed state. As Justin Logan and Christopher Preble argue, “failure is in the eye of the beholder.” Furthermore, many states fail to provide equitable levels of security and services to significant portions of their populations and may be seen as having failed specific communities or even the majority of their population but are unlikely to be considered “failed states” by the international community. Gabi Hesselbein of the Crisis States Research Centre in London further reminds careful observers that “even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local state organizations, might still exist.”

These caveats aside, it is clear that states that are highly vulnerable to both external and internal economic, military, political, and social dislocations and shocks present their neighbors and the international community at large with significant challenges. While it will be discussed in greater detail below, the classic case of contemporary state failure, Somalia, and the consequences for the Horn of Africa and the international community will be examined briefly here. In July/August 2010, Foreign Policy magazine ranked Somalia 1st on its survey of failed states. Further complicating the situation is the fact that military and political leaders are exploiting the divisive nature of Somalia’s clan-based society; in 2007, the international non-governmental organization (NGO) Minority Rights Group (MRG) ranked Somalia as the most dangerous country in the world for minority groups. While various initiatives have been attempted to restore order and stability in Somalia, no effective, and certainly no legitimate, government has exercised control in Somalia since at least 1991. Somalia’s internal divisions and weaknesses have provided Somalia’s neighbors, especially Ethiopia, with significant opportunities to seek to extend influence within Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa. The lack of any effective national government has also been cited as providing terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, with crucial safe havens to organize, recruit, and actually carry out operations.

Causes of State Failure

State failure consists of a partial or even complete sustained breakdown of multiple social institutions, including the various branches of the government, the formal economy, the military command, and social relations between competing classes and ethnic groups. The breakdown of these social institutions creates what Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart label the “sovereignty gap—the disjunction between the de jure assumption

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4 Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy, “The Failed States Index 2010” Foreign Policy July/August 2010.
that all states are ‘sovereign’ regardless of their performance in practice—and the de facto reality that many [states] are malfunctioning or collapsed states, incapable of providing their citizens with even the most basic services, and where the reciprocal set of rights and obligations are not a reality.” When these social political and social institutions breakdown or collapse, the civilian populations of these countries are either left to provide all political and social institutions and services by themselves or subjected to devastating armed conflict, perpetrated and perpetuated by dictators, aspiring strongmen, warlords, or criminal gangs. These varying and overlapping causes of state failure will be analyzed in greater detail below.

Dysfunctional and predatory political leaders and institutions are, almost by definition, critical components of state failure. Politicians that exploit the weaknesses of their respective executive, legislative, judicial, and military institutions and processes destroy the legitimacy of these institutions and processes and imperil the continued functioning of the state. When presidents, parliamentarians, and generals raid the public treasuries of their countries, with the most spectacular instances of fraud and theft amounting to billions of dollars for individual rulers and generals, government ministries, central banks, and social institutions lose vital resources that are rarely recovered or restored. When these same leaders invest millions of dollars into enhanced military and security forces that are designed not only for external defense, and at times aggression, but also for “internal defense,” civilians suffer from situations of extreme human insecurity and the further delegitimization of the state. Governments that spend millions on their militaries while significant portions of their populations starve, as exemplified by the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in the 1980s, will likely face armed resistance and violent conflict while civilian trust in the state will erode.

Dysfunctional political leadership combined with a poorly functioning judiciary often damages the foundations of the formal economy. When business leaders, investors, and workers see government ministers, parliamentarians, and judges enriching themselves through theft, bribery, extortion and other forms of corruption, many choose to limit their direct exposure to these forms of graft. Many bureaucrats, government functionaries, and teachers are paid sporadically and their salaries are often insufficient; in the most extreme cases, large numbers of government employees make too little to even afford public transportation to get to their jobs. In other cases, salaries are paid to phantom or “ghost” workers, leaving few resources to pay the actual civil servants charged with implementing government policies. Businesspeople, investors, and employees who need to obtain valuable documents or inquire about pending permits or court cases at these affected government ministries may choose to divert their financial resources into other economic activities, thus contributing to the further weakening of the formal, and potentially regulated, economy. While these processes certainly provide cause for serious concern, their effects may not become apparent for many years. “Collapsed states suffer from economic decline years before they finally collapse.”

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As domestic political institutions and the formal economy crumble and/or implode, donor governments and international organizations, including the United Nations System, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group, and regional organizations, may lose faith in the governments’ abilities to discharge their debts and responsibilities. States that rely primarily on the largesse of international organizations and foreign donors may face economic, political, and social meltdown if and when this aid is reduced and/or entirely removed. Conversely, the UN System and related international organizations are also frequently blamed for tolerating dictators and autocrats who created the conditions for state failure in the first place. When critics charge that the UN System or international community is creating the conditions for failed states, the preferred solution for many of these critics is armed intervention to destabilize and/or remove the oppressive regime in power. While this course of action may indeed remove one vile regime from power, the unintended consequences of such dramatic and profound actions may exacerbate an already troubling situation.

Foreign military intervention must also be considered as a potential cause of state failure. As oppressive and violent as Saddam Hussein’s regime was for over 20 years, Iraq was not widely perceived as exhibiting serious signs of state failure; on the contrary, “the regime built up a stable infrastructure as well as educational and medical delivery systems that were generally regarded as among the best in the Arab world. In addition, women were allowed far more rights than in almost any other Arab state.” This situation was effectively reversed for at least several years following the US-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Hussein’s regime in 2003. Former US Ambassador to the European Office of the United Nations Gerhard Helman asserts that “within months of conquering Iraq, the United States recognized that Iraq was a failed state incapable of restoring itself.” The most explicit recognition of Iraqi state failure following the invasion was the US restoration or “hand-over” of sovereignty to Iraqis at the end of June 2004.

Ultimately, as Ghani and Lockhart and other analysts argue, state failure represents a fundamental reassessment of the nature of state sovereignty, moving from the Machiavellian, Hobbesian, and Weberian notions of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence to the concept of a social contract and mutual responsibilities binding the state and its citizens. Furthermore, “legitimacy is not a one-time event conferred through an election or the establishment of a charismatic authority but a continuous process of deepening and broadening the rights and obligations of citizenship.” As increasingly fragile states lose more legitimacy as a result of their inability to meet economic, political, and social obligations for their citizens, these vulnerable states move towards situations of state failure. The Ad Hoc Working Group on

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9 Jeffrey Herbst, “Where Autocrats Don’t Fear to Tread” Foreign Policy July/August 2010.
Combating State Failure is tasked with elaborating a series of recommendations for the UN System and its constituent states.

**Case Study: Somalia**

Somalia’s coherence as a unified nation-state has always been rather fragile. The northern Somali province of Puntland has declared its autonomy from Somalia and the Transition Federal Government (TFG), the official government for Somalia, has struggled to establish its authority. In 2004, Puntland announced that it would expel Kenyan citizens in response to Kenya’s refusal to recognize Somali passports. The other primary northern province in Somalia, Somaliland, declared its independence from Somalia in the wake of former dictator Mohammed Siad Barre’s overthrow in 1991 but its independence has not been recognized by either the government of Somalia or any outside countries. Somaliland elected its first parliament in 2005 and it continues to issue its own currency and passports. While Somaliland has not been recognized by other countries, has experienced a “remarkable degree of stability - a sharp contrast to the continuing violence in some other parts of Somalia.” Unfortunately, on September 17, 2007, “fighting broke out between forces loyal to the self-declared independent republic of ‘Somaliland’ and the semi-autonomous region of ‘Puntland’ in Laasgaanood, the capital of the disputed Sool region.” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s new Special Representative in Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has been working with both sides to quell this violence and to bring all interested parties to the negotiating table.

As the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) seeks to extend its authority throughout Somalia, it must confront its greatest challenge: stabilizing Mogadishu. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), “the TFG’s inability to establish itself in the capital has undermined its credibility since it was formed in October 2004.” To effectively run Mogadishu and then extend its authority throughout Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government, led by President Sharif Ahmed must be prepared to constructively engage rival clans, including the Hawiye clan. The ICG argues that effective reconciliation between the TFG and the Hawiye leadership “will require a national power-sharing agreement that brings credible Hawiye leaders into positions of genuine authority within the transitional institutions.” To be seen as a true government of national unity, the TFG must also refrain from seizing greater power for itself and its allies and must also seek to incorporate legitimate and peaceful leaders from all of Somalia’s disparate clans. Delegates to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Combating State Failure may further wish to examine the emerging enclave of governance in Somaliland.

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and determine if there are critical elements of statebuilding and legitimacy that may be replicated throughout the country.\textsuperscript{19}

Somalia’s grave humanitarian and security situation is continually complicated by the efforts of neighboring states as well as Islamist and criminal organizations to ensure that Somalia remains weak and/or malleable. Ethiopia has exerted the most significant sustained influence over Somalia and since September 11, 2001, it has received crucial support from the United States, which considers Somalia to be a key front in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Eritrea has also provided support to different factions in Somalia, primarily to counterbalance Ethiopia. These two bitter enemies have not only fought each other over border issues [Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993] but, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), they “also waged a much smaller proxy war in southern Somalia.”\textsuperscript{20} Eritrea has armed and supported the forces of Hussein Mohammed Farah Aidid, a former president of Somalia and son of the late general who fought against the UN and the US in Mogadishu in the early 1990’s, and Ethiopia has backed several anti-Aidid factions, including the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA). Tensions flared again between Ethiopia and Eritrea in October 2005 when Eritrea refused to cooperate with the UN peacekeeping force on the border of the two countries (UNMEE) while simultaneously increasing arms shipments to Somali allies and proxies, including the notorious Islamic Courts in southern Somalia. Analysts from the International Crisis Group (ICG) argue that even though Ethiopia has won its share of the battles with Eritrea, “Asmara’s [Eritrea’s capital/government] strategic gambit paid significant dividends. At relatively low cost, Eritrea maneuvered Addis Ababa [Ethiopia’s capital/government] into a confrontation on two fronts: a major intervention in southern Somalia and a large defensive deployment along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border…”\textsuperscript{21} Most disturbing of all, the ICG predicts that “Asmara may continue to provide support in order to tie down Ethiopian troops in Somalia for as long as possible.”\textsuperscript{22} While these political and security maneuvers may cost Eritrea relatively little in the short term, there is always the possibility that Eritrea may suffer unintended consequences in the future because of its strategic involvement in southern Somalia. In the more immediate future, continued political and military intervention by Ethiopia and Eritrea may lead to a further deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in Somalia.

Mediation efforts, both those that originate primarily from Somalis as well as those driven by outside forces, will ultimately bear little fruit if political leaders and warlords cannot put aside their personal and factional differences. In October 2007, “the deepening political rift between President [Abdullahi] Yusuf and Prime Minister [Ali Mohamed] Gedi became a subject of legal debate,”\textsuperscript{23} ultimately leading to Gedi’s resignation at the end of October 2007. President Sharif and Prime Minister Omar

\textsuperscript{22} ICG, \textit{Somalia: The Tough Part is Ahead} 2007 p. 6.
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke are continuing this series of debilitating political rifts within the highest levels of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Political infighting and high levels of violence have not only destabilized Somalia but has made it much harder for those seeking to improve the situation to resolve the extant problems. A direct result of this political infighting and lack of state capacity is the continuing lack of legitimacy and sovereignty exhibited by the Somali TFG. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that “the United Nations security phases in effect in Somalia are indicative of the security situation. Mogadishu and the district of Badhadwe are in phase five (evacuation of all United Nations staff), and the remainder of Somalia is in phase four (emergency operations only), except for the western part of ‘Somaliland’, which is in phase three.”

In October 2008, representatives of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) signed a ceasefire agreement with leading opposition figures in Djibouti and Ethiopia pledged to remove most of its soldiers from Somali territory by the middle of November 2008. Unfortunately, “despite the peace deal, heavy fighting between Islamists and government forces killed dozens including a local al Shabaab commander”; at the end of October 2008, a suicide bombing in northern Somaliland killed over 20 people.

While the UN is not currently undertaking a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the African Union (AU) is. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1744 (S/RES/1744) on February 20, 2007, but it has been woefully undermanned since its inception. The British journal, The Economist, noted that “military experts reckoned that it would take at least 20,000 troops to impose order on central Somalia. The AU managed to get promises for 8,000. In fact, just 1,600 Ugandan troops have shown up.” In addition to the fact that only 20% of the pledged AU peacekeepers have so far been deployed in Sudan, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed that “the African Union is facing serious financial, logistical and other constraints in deploying troops which would join the two Ugandan battalions already in the Somali capital.” Improving the operational capacity of AMISOM as well as ensuring that it is properly financed will be of the utmost importance for the Security Council. In January 2010, the Security Council extended AMISOM’s mandate through January 31, 2011 and it welcomed the critical assistance of Burundi and Uganda in expanding the presence of AMISOM. More African Union (AU) states must commit themselves to enduring peace and stability in Somalia, however, in order to create the necessary policy space to establish a functional and sustainable Somali state. The success of AMISOM as well as of the various UN agencies and bodies operating in Somalia “may be viewed as a defining moment for the future of the organization [UN].”

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The economic viability of any future Somali state remains in serious doubt. According to the July 2008 Report of the Secretary-General, “the delivery of basic social services has virtually collapsed in most parts of the country. South-central Somalia, which was the economic heartland of the country, has been the hardest hit, and this has had a direct impact on economic growth and overall socio-economic development. Without annual remittances from the diaspora in excess of $1 billion, constituting an estimated 70 percent of Somalia’s gross domestic product, the majority of Somalis would be without any means of livelihood today.”\textsuperscript{30} The international community needs to assist Somalia through targeted aid and assistance that will allow Somalia to capitalize upon these vital remittances. As Somalia is unlikely to attract any significant amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), international donors will need to consider increasing offers of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as well as voluntary contributions to critical programs of the World Food Programme and related UN agencies. Reflecting upon the aforementioned challenges of integrating opposition elements into the Somali state, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in his May 2010 Report that “a major challenge for the Transitional Federal Government has been how to deal with defectors from the extremist groups, as the needs of these individuals may not be addressed through ongoing planning for disarmament and demobilization activities. The Government has thus far set up an interim inter-ministerial committee to address the matter. However, international support to this initiative has been minimal; hence UNPOS [UN Political Office for Somalia] is assisting the Government to approach donors and agencies for further support.”\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{National Responsibilities}

The opportunities and obligations of the international community, including the UN System, for preventing state failure and strengthening fragile states will be examined below but the lion’s share of the opportunities and obligations for preventing state failure and strengthening fragile or failing states are invariably found within these same states and their populations. Relying on foreign governments and populations to strengthen fragile or failing states, particularly if those states are not perceived as immediate security threats, is bound to be a sorely disappointing prospect. Fragile and potentially failing states will need assistance from the international community and the UN System but this assistance must be designed to augment and bolster national efforts and initiatives to arrest state failure and strengthen civil and government institutions for the future.

Armed conflict is frequently one of the leading causes of state failure, thus making successful conflict resolution, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of former combatants clear priorities for fragile and potentially failing states. Successful and sustainable conflict resolution is essential for arresting state failure as well as providing critical policy space for governments and development opportunities for businesses, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the overall society.

British economist Paul Collier estimates that if a society experiences a civil war that lasts on average 7 years, the society’s GDP will be approximately 15 percent lower than if the civil war had not occurred. Equally devastating if the prospect that societies that are just emerging from civil or international wars are highly prone to returning to situations of armed conflict within a decade of the conclusion of the previous war. Emphasizing successful conflict resolution, reconstruction, and rehabilitation is vital to avoiding this so-called conflict trap.

National plans for arresting and/or reversing state failure must emphasize inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, particularly perennially marginalized or excluded actors. While national governments will be expected to take the lead, especially in the beginning of these processes, and are ultimately the actors considered most directly accountable for the successes and/or failures of state building projects, it would be a colossal mistake to expect comprehensive results without the full and sustained participation of civil society groups and NGOs. In discussing the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan from 2004-2007, Ghani and Lockhart assert that “while the government set the rules and managed the finances, it contracted NGOs to manage the personnel, facilitate and support the program, organize elections at the local level, and appoint an international firm to provide management and oversight services.”

Sustainable development in fragile or previously failed states will require the establishment of a clear, inclusive rules-based system of prioritization of development projects and allocation of budgetary resources.

Fragile or previously failed states frequently confront a daunting host of demands from a wide variety of stakeholders; this is almost by definition one of the primary reasons for the fragility of these states. In the process of arresting or reversing state failure, governments must act with conviction and courage. Most importantly, they must deliver results. To allow these fragile or previously failed states the crucial policy space to deliver these results, which will increase the legitimacy of the state for many previously disaffected stakeholders, “the number of programs within difficult institutional environments should be limited initially and developed gradually but systematically.”

There is no magic number for the appropriate number of development initiatives that a fragile or previously failed state should undertake to engage in sustained state building; rather, these priorities must be determined by the relevant stakeholders in each instance. Furthermore, national governments and their civil society and international partners must clearly articulate that successful implementation of these development initiatives will require a minimum of six to twelve months per initiative, with more complex and/or comprehensive initiatives requiring even longer implementation periods. While there is no magic number of months or years needed to successfully implement statebuilding and related development projects, all relevant partners need to be prepared to commit potentially 10 years or more for comprehensive reversal of state failure and the creation of a new and enduring state.

34 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States 2009 p. 201.
**International Responsibilities**

Failed states present grave dangers for their neighbors and the international community as a whole, meaning that international actors, including the UN System, have considerable responsibilities when confronting situations of imminent or already extant state failure. Justin Logan and Christopher Preble argue that “the first requisite for success in addressing state failure is providing security for the nation builders in the affected areas.”³⁵ Unfortunately, the international community’s track record in providing this needed security is, at best, mixed. The multiple UN and new hybrid African Union-United Nations peacekeeping missions in Somalia have not succeeded in providing adequate security over sustained periods of time. While the UN and the AU must accept important degrees of responsibility for these failures, internal actors and neighboring states have at times subverted the legitimacy of the appointed presidents. Ethiopia and Eritrea have both interfered and, specifically in the case of Ethiopia, intervened directly in Somali affairs. Enhancing the overall security situation is clearly essential but military force alone is unlikely to resolve the multiple social conflicts and fractures that destabilized and/or debilitated the states in question in the first place.

The international community must therefore focus on providing financial and technical assistance to rebuild and/or scale up existing economic, legal, political, and social institutions. International actors, including the Secretariat of the United Nations, can provide crucial assistance by bringing relevant stakeholders together through mediation and negotiations. A critical carrot that the international community may effectively introduce during negotiations is the convening of an international donors conference upon the successful conclusion of negotiations and the initial implementation of the terms of the negotiations. Paul Collier argues that foreign aid, whether generated through international donors conference or as regular line-item expenditures for wealthier and/or concerned countries, “makes private investment more attractive and so helps to keep capital in the country.”³⁶ Financial assistance to fragile or previously failed states also needs to be disbursed in such a manner to allow for successful implementation of critical development initiatives but also with an eye towards reducing and/or eliminating corruption and graft.

International partners, including the UN System, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank Group, and regional development banks, transnational corporations (TNCs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must coordinate more effectively with national governments, civil society representatives, and local NGOs when designating and implementing development initiatives. Referring to the large numbers of international actors, including the media, and development partners that often descend on countries that have recently shifted from situations of armed conflict to peace, Ghani and Lockhart point to the fact that “these stakeholders affect the state’s ability to set rules, access resources (information, knowledge, trade systems, credit, aid), and determine the way its

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citizens are perceived from abroad.” Furthermore, many international actors, from donor governments to NGOs, emphasize the speed of delivery of projects and the implementation of development initiatives, often without the concomitant emphasis on quality of services and implementation that local populations value. One way to improve this situation would be for these international actors and development partners to plan for multi-year implementation and monitoring of the results rather than seeking to deliver services or implement projects within one fiscal year. States do not collapse overnight; it is unrealistic to expect that they may be (re)built overnight.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank have strengthened their connections over the past 4 years, with formal institutionalization of these connections occurring in October 2008. “Given the different mandates of UNDP and the World Bank, the two organizations have different yet complementary strengths – a situation that provides both incentive and opportunity for further cooperation. Whereas the World Bank is a major source of financing for poverty reduction and technical expertise on public finance management, UNDP has an ongoing country presence, including at the sub-national level, with a particular focus on developing national and local capacities and on recovery issues, among them reintegration of ex-combatants, peaceful management of conflicts, mine action and rule of law.” UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries Unit are working, often in direct coordination with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), in a number of countries that are striving to overcome the potentially debilitating legacies of armed conflict, including Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone as well as in the semi-autonomous and potentially sovereign southern Sudan. While all of these countries and regions are still relatively fragile states, Burundi and Sierra Leone are stronger and more cohesive states than before and the positive contributions of these international institutions, including the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) as well as the relevant UN peacekeeping missions in place, have been vital in strengthening and legitimizing these states.

Conclusion

Combating state failure requires comprehensive inclusive multistakeholder solutions. Equally critically, both internal and external stakeholders must prioritize appropriate development initiatives and then plan and budget for multi-year implementation of these initiatives. Military force has been one of the traditional solutions for arresting or reversing state failure but military force is not only a limited solution for arresting or reversing state failure, it has the potential for exacerbating the conditions that cause state failure in the first place. Creating, or at best rebuilding, a sustainable economy with viable formal legal employment and entrepreneurial opportunities is absolutely fundamental to combating state failure. The delegates to the

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Ad Hoc Working Group on Combating State Failure are now tasked with the responsibility of delivering to the Secretary-General a comprehensive report elaborating vital steps for combating and/or preventing state failure in the twenty-first century.

**Guiding Questions:**

How critical of a problem is state failure for the UN System and the international community? How critical is state failure of a regional neighbor to your country? How critical is state failure of a country outside of your region to your country?

What indicators are most useful in determining the likelihood of state failure by fragile states? Which indicators consistently matter most when assessing possible or likely state failure?

What are the responsibilities of domestic actors in combating state failure? What are the responsibilities of the diaspora communities of fragile states in combating state failure?

What are the responsibilities of international actors in combating state failure? How might the UN System, including its Specialized Agencies, most effectively partner with domestic and international actors interested in combating state failure?

In the event of state failure, what are the responsibilities of neighboring countries in terms of reversing state failure? Are there situations in which neighboring states should be excluded from taking any active role in reversing state failure because of potential conflicts of interest?

What countries besides Somalia does the international community need to analyze most closely for potential state failure?