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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

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“In my opinion, terrorism is a question which is not a short-term problem for all of us. It is a long-term fight. And NATO can play, and will play, a very crucial role in this struggle.” - Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of Poland (1995-2005)

Introduction

The end of the Second World War left the continent of Europe ruined economically and fractured geopolitically in a manner that would have been unprecedented just 35 years earlier. The rise of the Soviet Union in the east had created a new problem for the countries of Western Europe, less concerned now about German aggression and more preoccupied with the spread of communism. It was in this environment that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. Established by the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington D.C in 1949, NATO represented the vanguard of democracy against an ever present communist threat.

For much of its 60-year history, NATO primarily focused on the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, the Communist bloc's equivalent of NATO. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1992, however, left many countries and leaders wondering what exactly NATO's *raison d'être* was. The attacks of September 11th, 2001 represented a fundamental shift in the security priorities of virtually every NATO member state, and as a result NATO itself began to adapt to this new paradigm. For the next decade, NATO would see itself gradually move toward a policy stance that recognized terrorism as the most significant threat to the organization and its member states.

Terrorism is an international phenomenon that has affected countries and populations across the globe in unforeseen and negative ways. Most critically, global terrorism has changed the threat of attack on NATO member states from a fiction into a reality. While a myriad of efforts have been made to curb the spread of terrorism across the globe, the international nature of this phenomenon ensures that any concrete and long-term solutions will be multilateral in nature. As a result, NATO has played, and will continue to play, a critical role in helping to halt and reverse the threat of terrorism.

Scale of the problem

On the morning of September 11th, 2001, 19 terrorists, belonging to the militant Islamic group Al-Qaeda, hijacked 4 airliners in attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon. 2,977 civilians died in the attacks, with 372 of them being foreign nationals.¹ By the next day, NATO ambassadors had convened and had come to a unanimous decision. For the first time in the organization's history, the Article 5 commitment to collective defense would be invoked. Then NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson described the moment, later stating "In very different circumstances to that envisaged by the authors of Article 5 in 1949, the mighty Alliance had stood by an ally under attack. The world that day had changed, and NATO's transformation in the post-9/11 world had begun."²

Unfortunately, the 9/11 attacks represented just the first in a series of devastating attacks on NATO member state civilians. In March of 2004, a series of blasts tore through a number of commuter trains in Madrid, killing 191 and wounding over 1,800. The attack, which was perpetrated by an al-Qaeda inspired terrorist cell, once again highlighted the international nature of global terrorism and its ability to impact the populations of NATO member states. The NATO Secretary-General again spoke out, showing solidarity with Spain and restating NATO's "determination to vigorously pursue our efforts to combat terrorism."³

Just a year after the Madrid bombings, a similar attack took place on the London Tube, with four British nationals being implicated in the attack. 52 civilians were killed and over 700 injured, as a third NATO state fell victim to a devastating terrorist attack in less than 5 years. While many Europeans had often dismissed terrorism as an American issue, these two deadly attacks highlighted the threat global terrorism could pose to continental Europe. The full magnitude of the problem was felt on both sides of the Atlantic, and as a result NATO began taking on an increasing role in potential solutions to the problem.

In the years since the attacks, NATO has taken a number of measures to effectively increase its ability to prevent, and respond to, terrorist incidents across the globe. The 2002 NATO Summit in Rome and the 2004 in Istanbul laid the foundations for NATO's current anti-terror framework, and the last few years have seen the implementation and refinement of many of the policy objectives outlined earlier in the decade. It was at the 2006 Riga summit where NATO stated that the principle threats to the alliance over the next 10-15 years would be terrorism, along with combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

¹ <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13/khalid.sheikh.mohammed/index.html>

² http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/11-september/Lord_Robertson/EN/index.htm

³ <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/>

NATO's New Strategic Concept

NATO's most recent and dramatic initiative to revamp the organization's long-term policies came in 2010. At their Summit meeting in Lisbon, NATO leaders drafted and adopted a new Strategic Concept, which will serve as an organizational roadmap for NATO for the next decade. The Strategic Concept, which is intended as a replacement for the last Strategic Concept which was put into motion in 1999, is the first to deal with a post-9/11 geopolitical environment, in which the threats to the organization stem largely from non-state and rogue state actors, as opposed to more orthodox military threats.⁴

The new Strategic Concept recognizes this change in global affairs, yet still maintains at its core the Article 5 commitment to collective defense. However, one of the most critical issues in the drafting of the new Strategic Concept revolved around when, if necessary, to invoke Article 5. While most member states agreed that clearly egregious attacks, such as 9/11, would fall under the article, bigger questions arose out of smaller scale terrorist attacks and cyber attacks. NATO Secretary-General Anders Rasmussen put forth one solution to the issue by stating that there is nothing wrong with "constructive ambiguity". Ultimately, this was the direction the new Strategic Concept chose to go in, leaving many of the Article 5 norms unchanged and deliberately ambiguous to ensure the organization's flexibility in the future.⁵ NATO's new strategic concept also evaluated the level of implementation of several NATO initiatives pioneered in Prague and Istanbul, that were intended to aid in the fight against terrorism.

Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats

The 2004 Olympics Games in Athens presented one of the greatest security challenges in Greek history. As a NATO member, Greece enlisted the help of NATO to secure the games. Just a year prior, in 2003, NATO had authorized the creation of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defense Task Force (CBRN). This task force was specially trained to deal with CBRN attacks, and the Athens Games represented one of the first missions for the group. The games went off as planned, and since 2004 the CBRN Task Force has been at the forefront of NATO efforts to combat Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear threats.⁶

The 2002 Prague Summit outlined two critical necessities for enhancing NATO's capability to respond to WMD events: a deployable Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Analytical Laboratory, and a NBC response team. The CBRN Defense Task Force provides NATO with both of these capabilities, enabling it to take on WMD security operations as well as providing a quick response capability in the event of a terrorist attack or natural/industrial disaster.⁷ In addition to meeting these two principle objectives, NATO has established a Joint CBRN Center of Excellence in the Czech

⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm

⁵ <http://www.economist.com/node/17460712>

⁶ <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040719a.htm>

⁷ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49156.htm

Republic, intended to serve as a staging point and headquarters for NATO's CBRN assets.

The 2004 Istanbul Summit also led to progress on a number of CBRN initiatives. At Istanbul, member states reaffirmed their commitments to arms control and the continued implementation of current non-proliferation regimes and endorsed a number of non-NATO initiatives, including Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540.

Cyber Attacks

In addition to the growing threat of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear threats, one growing concern that NATO has recently had to deal with concerns cyber-attacks. Just a year after the September 11th attacks, NATO recognized the need to improve its "capabilities to defend against cyber attacks". This was outlined in the 2002 Prague Summit capabilities commitment that NATO members agreed to. While the priority was put forth, cyber-attacks continued to remain relatively low in NATO's priorities when it came to combatting terrorism, often overshadowed by the situation in Afghanistan, the 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 2005 attacks in London.⁸

The 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia, however, highlighted the radical need for a comprehensive cyber-attacks framework, both as it relates to non-Nato member states belligerents and possible terrorist groups. In January 2008, NATO leaders met to develop a framework to combat the emerging cyber-threats posed to the organization, and as a result the "NATO Policy on Cyber Defense" was created.

Three core pillars of cyber defense policy were identified in the "NATO Policy on Cyber Defense." The first pillar, subsidiarity, recognized the sovereignty of NATO member nations and decreed that NATO assistance to combat cyber-threats would only be rendered at the request of a member state. The second pillar, non-duplication, recognized the structures already in place at regional, national and international levels. As such, non-duplication calls for NATO to avoid the unnecessary duplication of structures and capabilities that are already in place to combat cyber-threats. When possible, NATO would strive to work within these existing structures, only going outside them when the structures and capabilities in place to combat cyber-terrorism were seen as insufficient. The final pillar was security. This pillar recognized that effective solutions to cyber-security threats would require cooperation and trust on the part of member states, given the sensitivity of information that would need to be made accessible in order to effectively combat any threat.⁹

In 2010, NATO leaders agreed to the Lisbon Summit Declaration and a new Strategic Concept, which among other things provides for a new and updated framework through which NATO will deal with cyber-threats. The declaration highlighted NATO's goal of bringing its Computer Incident Response Capability (CIRC) to full operational capability by the end of 2012, as well as reaffirmed NATO's commitment to work with

⁸ <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/11-september/Cyber-Threads/EN/index.htm>

⁹ http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf

national and international actors to combat cyber-threats. In addition, the “NATO Policy on Cyber Defense” was updated. The most radical change was the designation of cyber-threats as a potential reason to invoke Article 5 to provide for the collective defense of NATO members.¹⁰

The Defense against Terrorism Program

When it comes to combating terrorism across the globe, NATO recognizes the importance of having the proper tools and technology to effectively minimize, and if necessary combat, terrorist threats. In line with this priority, during the 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, the Defense against Terrorism Program was approved, with the intent to foster cooperation among NATO member states, in developing and manufacturing unique and effective technologies intended to protect NATO troops across the globe, as well as civilians of NATO member states, from the threat of terrorist attacks.¹¹

The Defense against Terrorism Program has spurred NATO to identify 10 areas where the application of new technology has the potential to curb terrorist threats, and a number of NATO member states have chosen to take the lead in developing technologies for each of these 10 areas. The Defense against Terrorism program is expected to go a long way to improving the effectiveness and flexibility of a number of NATO operations being run across the globe.

Operation in Afghanistan

The state of affairs in Afghanistan is in many ways a paradigm of the globalization phenomenon. The internal relations among parties in the nation are astoundingly complex, as different factions upholding different worldviews and inheriting differing historical legacies vie for influence and dominance. It would be impossible for policymakers today to resolve conflict within Afghanistan without becoming somewhat acquainted with the country’s history. Afghanistan sits squarely in the center of the Old World, a crossroads of trade routes and a strategic advantage to its possessor. As a result, Afghanistan has never quite been capable of distancing itself enough from its neighbors and gaining enough sovereignty to chart its own path. In more recent history, Afghanistan has undergone extended periods of occupation by both the USSR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacebuilding mission known today as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Most national governments are at least partially acquainted with the difficulties facing the ISAF troops in the country, including their efforts to destroy the Taliban networks as well as gain the support of the populace. The current NATO-led ISAF states its mission as: “...to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance.”¹²

¹⁰ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease

¹¹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50313.htm

¹² http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm

In addition to a coalition of Western countries, ISAF includes small but symbolic troop contributions from Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and a significant contingent from Turkey. While Turkey's total troop contribution may not be as high as that of a number of its NATO allies, Turkey's long history of friendly relations with Afghanistan and status as the only Muslim majority member of NATO are oft cited elements of ISAF's prospects for a successful mission.¹³ ISAF at first was limited in its scope to the capital of Kabul and the surrounding areas, relying on allied war chiefs to combat Taliban forces elsewhere. Local warlords typically maintain a local focus except insofar as it may advance their own personal ambitions, namely to become president of Afghanistan or to acquire greater wealth. Whenever American or ISAF militaries pursue more traditional warfare, particularly using powerful air strikes to destroy Taliban military capacities, they risk alienating local support because of widely publicized reports of large-scale civilian casualties.¹⁴ ISAF's long-term stability is threatened by its internal fragility; the war in Afghanistan is very unpopular in many ISAF countries and governments that support the war may fall in the wake of scandals or casualties. On August 1, 2010, the Netherlands became the first ISAF country to withdraw its troop contingent from Afghanistan but it is clear that other governments are considering following suit, particularly in countries where the war in Afghanistan is a prominent electoral issue¹⁵; Canada removed its combat forces in 2011 but still has approximately 500 soldiers in Afghanistan to assist in training of the Afghan police. In June 2012, French President Francois Hollande announced that all French troops would leave Afghanistan by the end of 2012.¹⁶

ISAF's stability is further threatened by command and control issues and disputes over the appropriate strategic doctrine to be pursued; in June 2010, President Obama relieved General Stanley McChrystal of command in Afghanistan after disparaging comments about the Obama Administration and NATO allies surfaced in a *Rolling Stone* interview. The corresponding political flap over McChrystal's dismissal had barely subsided before the publication of tens of thousands of pages of leaked documents as well as disagreements within the US government and military over the appropriate pace of any planned drawdown of forces from Afghanistan.¹⁷ Paramount among the concerns for all ISAF countries is the rising level of violence in Afghanistan, particularly when that violence takes the lives of their soldiers, civilian personnel, and humanitarian aid workers. July and August 2010 were amongst the deadliest months of the entire time that US military forces have operated in Afghanistan, and other ISAF countries experienced higher casualty rates as well.¹⁸ Even with the stated impending deadline of 2014 for withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is a strong possibility that at least some NATO

¹³ Aydemir Erman, "How Turkey can help NATO in Afghanistan" *Christian Science Monitor* February 9, 2010.

¹⁴ *The Economist*, "Collateral damage of every sort" September 10, 2009.

¹⁵ Radio Netherlands Worldwide (RNW), "Netherlands: first NATO member to leave Afghanistan" August 1, 2010.

¹⁶ *BBC News*, "French troop pullout from Afghanistan to start in July" June 9, 2012.

¹⁷ Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, "US Military to Press for Slower Afghan Drawdown" *New York Times* August 11, 2010.

¹⁸ Rahim Faiez, "5 American Troops Killed in Latest Afghan Violence" *The Washington Post* August 31, 2010.

states, particularly the US, will maintain a significant security presence in Afghanistan after 2014.¹⁹

The complex and often tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan extend to the ISAF countries involved in the region. Strong criticisms and accusations of corruption, incompetence, and duplicity have frequently strained relations between the US and Pakistan. When US Navy Seals assassinated Osama bin Laden in early May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan, many Pakistanis were upset by the US-led mission occurring on their territory; furthermore, many Americans and Pakistanis wondered aloud how much Pakistani and American government officials knew about bin Laden's whereabouts and for how long.²⁰ In November 2011, an American airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and Pakistan sealed off a crucial border crossing into Afghanistan that NATO relied upon for shipping supplies into the field. After months of diplomatic wrangling, the US government issued a formal apology to Pakistan for the unintentional killing of its soldiers and agreed to a larger transit tax of \$1500-\$1800 USD per NATO truck, a lucrative tax that may net Pakistan approximately \$1 million USD per day²¹; the reopening of the transit route also persuaded the US Congress to release hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid that had been delayed at least in part because of the closed transit route. While NATO's leadership appears relieved to have at least temporarily resolved the transit route impasse, there are still questions as to how effectively Pakistani security forces will monitor the border and prevent "insurgents" from the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* from crossing into Afghanistan.²² As NATO and affiliated governments with troops and logistical components contemplate their approaching deadlines for withdrawal, they must maintain and/or enhance their relationships with Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. "All four border Afghanistan and have provided NATO with essential supply routes and bases in return for generous financial and political compensation."²³

Many NATO countries as well as all of the Permanent Members of the Security Council have considerable economic, political, and security interests at stake in Afghanistan. Referring to Russia's recent overtures to improve relations with Afghanistan, Andrew Kramer notes that Russia is seeking contracts to renovate or refurbish Soviet-era infrastructure and "the Kremlin is also looking to blunt Islamic extremism in Central Asia, which poses a threat to Russia's security, particularly in the Caucasus, and to exploit opportunities in the promising Afghan mining and energy industries."²⁴ Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently hosted the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan to address the problems stemming from "fighting

¹⁹ Michael R. Gordon, "US in Talks with Afghans on Presence After 2014" *The New York Times* November 15, 2012.

²⁰ Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, "Amid Skepticism, Pakistan Calculates its Response" *The New York Times* May 2, 2011.

²¹ *The Economist*, "Keep on truckin'" May 16, 2012.

²² Dan Murphy, "Why the Taliban are Happy that the US and Pakistan Patched Things Up" *The Christian Science Monitor* July 31, 2012.

²³ Judy Dempsey, "No Easy Exit for NATO in Afghanistan" *New York Times* December 10, 2012.

²⁴ Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia Pushes to Increase Afghanistan Business Ties" *The New York Times* August 18, 2010.

terrorism and drugs spreading from Afghanistan.”²⁵ China maintains extensive interests throughout the region, in part as a check on the growing power of India as well as to minimize its difficulties with its Uighur community in western China; reports have surfaced at various points of Uighur fighters training and fighting alongside the Taliban.²⁶ The US, in addition to its immediate political and security interests, recently identified enormous deposits of valuable metals and industrial resources with a current estimated value of nearly \$1 trillion USD.²⁷ While mining companies from around the region and around the world are already competing for access to these vital mineral deposits, “the problem is companies remain hesitant about investing in the country whilst the current security issues remain unresolved.”²⁸ Ensuring that these minerals are extracted in a sustainable manner that fosters rising living standards and real human development in Afghanistan, while preventing a contemporary version of “the Great Game”, is a new and keystone challenge for NATO and the international community.

Operation Active Endeavor

Following the September 11th attacks, NATO immediately began Operation Active Endeavor, a maritime patrol and interdiction mission intended to show NATO solidarity following the attacks, and to help identify and deter any terrorist activities in the Mediterranean Sea. Following the 9/11 attacks, 65% of Western Europe’s oil and natural gas supplies passed through the Mediterranean, making the sea a critical thoroughfare for energy and commerce. As an Article 5 mission, Operation Active Endeavor initially involved only NATO member states. However, in years following the beginning of the operation, non-NATO member states, such as Russia, Israel, Morocco and the Ukraine, began lending maritime resources as well as intelligence to assist in the operation.

To date, NATO vessels participating in Operation Active Endeavor have hailed over 100,000 vessels, and stopped and searched over 150 suspicious vessels. The decade long mission has refined and enhanced NATO’s maritime anti-terror capabilities, and has allowed NATO to establish durable and productive relationships with non-NATO member states that border the Mediterranean. In addition, NATO vessels participating in the operation have been able to carry out rescue missions on a number of occasions, evacuating oil wells and on one occasion rescuing a sinking ship with some 250 refugees aboard. Operation Active Endeavor highlighted NATO’s capability to effectively conduct maritime missions, and perhaps more importantly, reflected its ability to work with non-NATO member states in an anti-terror capacity.

²⁵ Vladimir Isachenkov, “Medvedev talks with Afghan, Pakistani leaders” *The Washington Post* August 18, 2010.

²⁶ Thomas Joscelyn, “Evaluating the Uighur Threat” *The Long War Journal* October 9, 2008.

²⁷ James Risen, “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan” June 13, 2010.

²⁸ James Melik, “Afghan wealth stifled by security fears” *BBC News* June 25, 2010.

NATO and Russia

The threat of terrorism represents one of the arenas in which the interests of NATO and Russia can be said to be very similar. Russia has faced a number of serious terrorist threats in the recent past, as evidenced by the 1999 Russian apartment bombings that left 300 dead and kicked off the second Chechen war, and the 2002 Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis that left 120 Russians and 39 attackers dead. As a result of this history, Russia is as committed as any nation to combating terrorism, internationally and domestically.²⁹

The 2002 NATO Summit in Rome saw the creation of the NATO-Russia council (NRC), which was designed as a forum for increased NATO-Russian cooperation on issues such as terrorism, the situation in Afghanistan, and combating the narcotics trade. The council is composed of the 28 NATO member states and Russia, and is chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO. Meetings among ambassadors and military representatives take place monthly, with foreign ministers meeting bi-annually. In 2011 the foreign ministers of NRC member states met in Berlin to draft an updated NRC Action Plan against Terrorism. The summit built upon the original 2004 NRC Action Plan against Terrorism, and focused on three separate facets of dealing with issues of terrorism: Preventing terrorist attacks, Combating Terrorist activities, and Managing the consequences of terrorist acts.³⁰

When it comes to preventing terrorist attacks, the NRC has focused in recent years on implementing the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which is intended to foster cooperation on airspace security issues, most notably on averting terrorist threats in the air. The CAI focuses on increasing the level of information exchange that takes place between NATO and Russia, and is intended to be implemented in tandem with the Stand-Off Detection of Explosives Program, which focuses on technological cooperation in the field of explosives detection. In addition to these two initiatives, the NRC and its member states actively work towards improving the security and stability of Afghanistan, with the intent to limit terrorism in the nation and the region.³¹

Relations within NATO

While NATO makes extensive efforts to cultivate effective and positive relations with non-member states, equal as critical to the Organization's success is internal solidarity. Following the 9/11 attacks, Article 5 was invoked in part as a way for NATO member states to show solidarity with the United States. Given the makeup of the Alliance, this was viewed by many as a way for Europe to show solidarity with the United States. While 9/11 represented a high watermark in the trans-Atlantic relationship, this cooperative environment quickly deteriorated over concerns about war in Iraq. Germany, France and Belgium blocked a NATO action to move military equipment into

²⁹ <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/01/25/f-moscow-bombing-de-waal.html>

³⁰ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50091.htm

³¹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_72737.htm

Turkey in the run up to the Iraq war, and NATO as an institution became a battleground between those in favor of going to war against Iraq, and those against.³²

While the issues and tensions created by Iraq began to dissipate following greater NATO involvement in the conflict, there still remains a subtle, but long lasting tension between the United States and many European NATO members concerning defense spending. In 2011, Obama Administration officials warned European NATO member's that the United States could not "continue to shoulder a disproportionate burden of maintaining the alliance," with the US representing 75% of the Alliance's defense spending.³³ Despite American promises to roll back defense spending, European NATO members appear equally unwilling to accept a larger share of the burden. This presents a serious budgetary issue for the organization, and could hamper the Alliance's efforts to combat terrorism. Perhaps an even bigger issue though, is the possibility that budgetary disputes between the United States and other NATO members could lead to policy disputes between the two, threatening to undo the 10 years of progress made in the fight against terrorism.³⁴

Intelligence Sharing

The attacks of 9/11 made it abundantly clear that the status quo intelligence capabilities and organizations needed to be improved. Immediately following the attacks, NATO created a temporary terrorism intelligence unit, which would later evolve into the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit following the 2002 Prague Summit. The TTIU focused on assessing the risk terrorism posed to NATO and its member nations and assessing potential terrorist capabilities and organizational networks.³⁵

At the 2004 Istanbul Summit, the intelligence structures of NATO were revamped, and over the next seven years a number of new intelligence initiatives were implemented, in order to better able NATO to assess and confront terrorist threats across the globe. A new intelligence liaison group was created at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, while a separate Intelligence Liaison Unit was set up at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. By 2010 the TTIU has been phased out, replaced by the newly created Intelligence Unit. Most notable in this change was the increase in cooperation between the civilian and military intelligence components of NATO's intelligence apparatus.

In addition to internal organizational structures intended to facilitate greater coordination between NATO member states, the Alliance also has a number of agreements with other international bodies in order to ensure effective intelligence sharing. NATO works closely with UN bodies such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, as well as the Security Council and the Executive Directorate.³⁶ NATO also

³² <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747443.stm>

³³ http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nato-allies-grapple-with-shrinking-defense-budgets/2012/01/20/gIQAKBg5aQ_story.html

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm?selectedLocale=en

³⁶ <http://natolibguides.info/intelligence>

has sought to improve its intelligence sharing relations with non-NATO allies, such as Australia and New Zealand³⁷, during the past few years.

Conclusion

NATO has redefined its purpose and its capabilities in the decade since the 9/11 attacks, and it is no longer simply an organization looking east, guarding against a Russian threat. The NATO of today has committed itself to a number of different initiatives, and has come to realize the immense security and political problem that global terrorism represents. It will be up to this committee to carry on that legacy of progress.

Guiding Questions

How has your country been affected by the terrorism, either on an international or domestic level? What steps has your country taken unilaterally in an attempt to deal with the issue?

What role has your country played in past NATO summits and treaties? What are some political constraints or considerations, domestic or international, that may affect your country's counter-terrorism policies as they relates to NATO?

Which initiatives has your country been most involved in NATO's fight against Terrorism? How, if at all, have any of these initiatives helped your country better deal with the issue of terrorism?

What further actions can be taken in order to better prepare NATO and her member states against terrorist threats?

Are there any issues in which NATO may benefit from greater cooperation with other international organizations? Which ones?

Resolutions & Treaties

Security Council Resolution 1373

Security Council Resolution 1540

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty

³⁷ *BBC News*, "New Zealand signs NATO partnership deal" June 5, 2012.