



Florida High Schools Model United Nations

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Redefining International Norms of Peacebuilding

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Introduction

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 recognizes that “we cannot hope for sustainable development without peace, stability, human rights, and effective governance based on the rule of law.” While some regions are relatively stable, “others fall into seemingly endless cycles of conflict and violence. This is not inevitable and must be addressed.” This is one of the cornerstones of the SDGs, with the rest of the goals being unattainable or exceedingly difficult to achieve if not for peace and overall political stability. One of the ways the UN aims to accomplish this goal is to “strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity [i.e., the ability of a state to govern its land and people] at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence.” This means to an end is commonly known as “peacebuilding.” The term first arose in 1975 when sociologist Johan Galtung advocated for organizations to address the “root causes” of violent conflict and work toward supporting domestic conflict resolution.¹ In effect, peacebuilding is strengthening national capacities for conflict management and sustainable development, all intending to reduce the risk of conflict and violence in the future.²

Peacebuilding, sometimes known as state building, solely focuses on preventing future wars and rebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. Its principles are based on strengthening and stabilizing institutions. The measures to achieving peace in conflict-ridden nations and regions is an inherently political task. That said, for a state to attain peace and security, stabilization must go beyond institutions to a nation’s economy, judicial system, civil society, and every aspect of life. There have been several examples of peacebuilding stabilizing conditions in a country or region by reestablishing state capacity, providing conflict resolution tactics, and supporting a democratic political process.

In reality, this is the exception rather than the rule. Many instances see developed nations use their authority and influence, under the guise of peacebuilding, to exert their ideology and self-interests on the nation and people the international community was supposed to support, often to a destabilized states’ detriment. In these cases, peacebuilding – an effort based on revitalizing a state – becomes a project grounded in the self-interest of nations seeking hegemony, where motivations are no longer based on achieving peace and security but instead seeking to create a strong ally in a volatile region.

Developed countries have used peacebuilding as a justification to influence and sometimes coerce developing countries to adhere to a certain ideology, economic system, or political system. That justification is far removed from Galtung’s 1975 definition and even further removed from any SDGs. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) must take action on the manipulation of this nonpolitical practice and redefine the norms surrounding peacebuilding to ensure that it returns to being a reliable means to ensuring nations’ independence – both from foreign influence and domestic terrorism – stability, and capacity to provide necessities to their populations.

¹ Peacebuilding Support Office, “UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation,” September 2010, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf.

² K. Van Brabant, “What Is Peacebuilding? Statebuilding and Peacebuilding” (Interpeace, 2010), https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/2010_IP_What_Is_Peacebuilding_Statebuilding_And_Peacebuilding.pdf

A History of Peacebuilding

From 1975 until the early 1990s, the history of peacebuilding was relegated to academic publications, where the vitality of international relations developed and gained more widespread attention amongst the global community. Eventually, the term entered international legal vernacular in 1992, when the United Nations released “An Agenda for Peace,” a report of the Secretary-General, defined peacebuilding (called “peacemaking”) as the ability to “identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.”³ Although the definition was now official, the academic and diplomatic community grappled with how the UN was to build and maintain peace in times of instability and state failure.

Western international relations philosophy is dominated by the idea that if a government has a democratic system, there will be fewer conflicts since those who are affected most – the people – are the ones deciding whether or not to incite violence.⁴ Additionally, groups within that system will not have to resort to violence to have their voices heard, further mitigating violence. Using this philosophy, Western nations determined that implementing democracies in postwar or conflict-prone countries was the instrument for peacebuilding. Almost immediately after “An Agenda for Peace,” this philosophy was tested to the effect of multiple failures in war-torn nations that reverted to violence and strife. In 1997, political scientists set forth an argument that democratizing nations as a means of peacebuilding are ineffective because these nations usually “do not possess the required infrastructure, socio-economic stability or political will to embark on elections.”⁵ Peacebuilding did not mean exporting democracy and democracy alone – there needed to be a more comprehensive solution to achieving stability.

One strategy the international community has employed is much older than the term peacebuilding, which is state-building. According to the Center for Global Development, state-building is “creating and strengthening the institutions necessary to support long-term economic, social, and political development.”⁶ This definition shows that peacebuilding and state-building are closely related. Whereas peacebuilding aims to create a sense of sustainable peace, state-building aims to bolster state capacity and legitimacy to grant them autonomy, political stability, and, hopefully, peace. Statebuilding comes in many forms, but it usually consists of an international bloc or developed nation dedicating resources to a developing nation to help that nation develop a stable economic, political, and societal structure.

Modern Definitions of Peacebuilding

It is generally held that state-building is an integral part of the peacebuilding process. When successful, state-building creates mechanisms – for instance, a judicial system – that provide “a credible arena and framework... for social groups to express their preferences and

³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Un Secretary-General, “An Agenda for Peace :: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping : Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 /: Boutros Boutros-Ghali,” 1992, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749>.

⁴ Mark Barrow, “Understanding Peacebuilding: An Issue of Approach Rather than Definition,” *E-International Relations* (blog), February 17, 2022, <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/02/17/understanding-peacebuilding-an-issue-of-approach-rather-than-definition/>.

⁵ Barrow, “Understanding Peacebuilding.”

⁶ “State Building and Global Development,” Center For Global Development | Ideas to Action, 2005, <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/state-building-and-global-development>.

resolve their conflicts nonviolently,” which is the primary goal of peacebuilding.⁷ Some nations even hold today that state-building is *necessary* for peacebuilding. This conflation is dangerous, as state-building is much more likely than peacebuilding to devolve into a political policy objective, as the long history of state-building demonstrates: many times, nations attach political *quid pro quos* to their state-building aid, thereby removing peacebuilding as the primary objective of state-building. Frequently, this leads to nations using peacebuilding to legitimize harmful state-building practices, some examples of which will be discussed in the case studies section.

Varying Perspectives of the International Community

The idea of state-building as a means of peacebuilding is a contested topic in both academic and diplomatic circles, with many nations deploring state-building as an encroachment on a nation’s sovereignty, a form of extortion, and even a means to inciting more conflicts.⁸ However, other nations hold state-building as central to their foreign policy, and their only preferred peacebuilding means. The following will describe the perspectives of the international community on peacebuilding and state-building and whether the latter should be a necessary part of the former.

While Africa is at the center of all six continents geographically, it has become a central aspect of international attention over the past 20 years. Since 2000, China has gradually overtaken the European Union and has become Africa's most important trading partner. Its trade with African nations has nearly tripled over the past twenty years, largely due to China's Belt and Road initiative on the continent.⁹ While China's newfound interest in the continent of Africa has many geopolitical consequences, it has created tension with many Western nations as a new geopolitical battleground for market and technological advantages has formed due to China’s recent interest. China's interest in Africa comes nearly a century after the West's “Scramble for Africa,” in which many Western (predominantly European) nations conquered nearly all of Africa under their control as part of their separate empires.¹⁰ China's recent push has put Western powers on high alert as they do not wish to lose geopolitical control over this region.¹¹

The current global security architecture is polarized between Western countries like the US, UK, and France, who claim to promote a human-centered world order founded on liberal values, and Russia and China, who favor state sovereignty and security. African nations, though influenced by liberal ideals, are caught in the middle of this rivalry. With concerns over preserving their sovereignty and territorial integrity, many African governments lean towards the non-Western vision promoted by Russia and China, where economic progress has been achieved without liberal democracy. This reveals vulnerabilities in Africa's domestic governance and international alignments, as evidenced by divisions at recent UN Security Council meetings over issues like the crisis in Ethiopia.¹² Though state-building in Africa has been shaped by liberal values espoused by the West, the exercise of power frequently contradicts those principles. The

⁷ Van Brabant, “What Is Peacebuilding? Statebuilding and Peacebuilding.”

⁸ MaryHope Schwoebel, “State-Building and Democracy,” *Nova*, January 1, 2011, https://www.academia.edu/38389399/State_Building_and_Democracy.

⁹ Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 12, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa>.

¹⁰ Britannica Kids. “Scramble for Africa,” n.d. <https://kids.britannica.com/kids/article/Scramble-for-Africa/632997>.

¹¹ ISSAfrica.org, “The West, Its Competitors and African State Building - ISS Africa.”

¹² ISSAfrica.org, “The West, Its Competitors and African State Building - ISS Africa.”

success of China and other Asian nations offers an alternate developmental model that many African countries find appealing compared to the West's post-Cold War prescriptions.

This tension became apparent during the United Nations Security Council's first session about the situation in Ethiopia, where the Ethiopian government was faced with an armed conflict stemming from the Tigray People's Liberation Front.¹³ The multiple blocks formed within this session all had opinions on the conflict within Ethiopia, all tying back to the values and morals they seemingly preach. Many African nations agreed that the conflict was something that Ethiopia had the right to defend itself in acknowledgment of territorial integrity as defined in Article 2(4) of the UN charter, where sovereign states have a right to defend their borders and all territory in them from another state.¹⁴ This idea of territorial integrity was shared not only by African nations but also gained support from Russia and China as well as France (a Western bloc exception) as the A3+1 block "stand in solidarity with the Government and the people of Ethiopia at this defining moment in their pursuit of sustainable peace that is conducive to nation-building and prosperity."¹⁵ However, this idea of territorial integrity was not shared amongst all 15 Security Council members. It came under fire from the "Western bloc," who claimed that it was "urgent to ensure humanitarian access"¹⁶ and also "call for unrestricted and unconditional humanitarian access into and within all parts of Tigray."¹⁷

This disagreement between the blocs is not uncommon. It can be seen deep-rooted in many long-lasting conflicts and continuously leads to stalemates within the chamber as vetos fly on potentially life-saving resolutions. The Security Council must work together and find some common ground in defining peacebuilding and state-building to avoid continuously putting nations and their citizens in the crosshairs of the ongoing geopolitical war between China, Russia, and the United States. These conflicts cannot continue to be used as battlegrounds that are ultimately detrimental to the unanimously adopted "Responsibility to Protect" resolution, which ensures that the international community never again fails to halt mass atrocities from being committed against humanity. It is now time for nations to put their geopolitical agendas aside and fulfill the duties of the UN Security Council to "maintain international peace and security," as codified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Case Studies

Since 1945, the international community has witnessed several instances of peacebuilding, with varying degrees of success. Each case study presents different contexts, periods, persons involved, and political circumstances. While it is important to remember that several themes emerge from over 75 years of peacebuilding that the Security Council must keep

¹³ "Voicing Support for African Union's Peace Efforts in Ethiopia, Security Council Speakers Urge Political Dialogue between Parties to Prevent Disaster | UN Press," November 8, 2021, <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14693.doc.htm>.

¹⁴ "Chapter I: Article 2(1)–(5) — Charter of the United Nations — Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Codification Division Publications," n.d., <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml>.

¹⁵ Security Council Seventy-Sixth Year 8812th Meeting Friday, 2 July 2021, 3 p.M. New York. : United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2021.

¹⁶ Security Council Seventy-Sixth Year 8812th Meeting Friday, 2 July 2021, 3 p.M. New York. : United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2021.

¹⁷ Security Council Seventy-Sixth Year 8812th Meeting Friday, 2 July 2021, 3 p.M. New York. : United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2021.

in mind to understand the international norms of peacebuilding, their flaws, and how to sidestep those same issues when debating possible solutions.

Case Studies: Successes in Practice

Two of the first instances of peacebuilding in modern international history came after World War II. The first began in May 1945, when Nazi Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allied powers, who then divided the country into four zones of occupation. When the Allies took control of Germany, nearly the entire nation was decimated, and the threat of famine overshadowed each passing day. The second began in August 1945, when Japan followed suit and surrendered. Within ten years, both nations experienced economic booms and exponential increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while never coming close to a rekindling of violence or conflict. Both cases, when viewed at face value, were successful interactions of peacebuilding, though the reality is more nuanced. In both cases, the Allied Powers – specifically the United States and the United Kingdom – used politically-based state-building practices under peacebuilding to advance self-serving policy goals in Europe and Asia.

The Marshall Plan and the Wirtschaftswunder

Historians view the ascension of President Harry S. Truman into the White House after the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt as an accelerator of the Cold War. Truman's most famous quote before his presidency was in 1941 when he opined that the United States should enter World War II, but only on the losing side. When the notoriously anti-Soviet Union Truman entered office, he and his administration worried that the widespread famine in Germany would not incite violence but encourage the German people to adopt communist views. In response to this fear, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, which aimed to "contain" communism in the nations where it existed while fighting to keep communism out of non-communist countries.¹⁸ To keep communism out of Europe, Truman appointed General George C. Marshall as Secretary of State, who outlined a multi-billion dollar plan to rebuild Europe completely. The money was meant for the entirety of Europe, but there was one caveat: the only way a nation could receive the funds was if it was not communist or would agree to disavow communist practices.¹⁹ This way, the US could be seen as a generous, peacebuilding nation, and those who did not accept the money were 'stuck in their ways,' all while the US built up Western Europe in its image and likeness.

The American public was entirely on board with the Marshall Plan. In 1948, a poll asked Americans what would happen if the Marshall Plan did not pass Congress. The most popular answer was that Europe would become communist, followed by the second and third most popular answers, a devolution of the situation back into violence.²⁰ For Americans, state-building

¹⁸ President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.

¹⁹ Grietje Baars, "Capitalism's Victor's Justice? The Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII," in *The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials*, ed. Kevin Heller and Gerry Simpson (Oxford University Press, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199671144.003.0008>, 175; See also Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, Penguin Books: History (Penguin Publishing Group, 2006), <https://books.google.com/books?id=10oPnprPjcgC>, 176.

²⁰ Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll # 1948-0412: Politics/Defense, Question 36, USGALLUP.48-412T.QT07D, Gallup Organization, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1948), Survey question, DOI: 10.25940/ROPER-31087395.

was the only way to peacebuilding, even if it compromised the autonomy of Europe. To receive international peacebuilding aid, nations – even non-communist ones – had to sacrifice their sovereignty to fit the mold of what the US envisioned: Europe as a bulwark against communism. Even amongst the United States’ allies that were not communist, the Marshall Plan subverted democratic processes in the name of “peace.” One notable example was the US use of Marshall aid to pressure the French and Italian governments against appointing left-leaning or communist politicians.²¹

To revive the West German economy more quickly in the late 1940s, the American and British governments supported the early end of the ‘denazification’ processes throughout West Germany. This included the trial and imprisonment of Nazi war criminals, the barring of former Nazis from holding public office, and the general payment of reparations for the cost of the war. All three of these tactics were put to a premature end by the early 1950s.²² Those Germans who built up the economy and collaborated with the Third Reich in the 1930s and 40s were out of prison and the defendants’ dock and back in positions of economic power, leading the charge against communism. With these changes and the use of US funds to rebuild Europe as a repellent to communism, West Germany had become the industrial powerhouse of Europe and a decidedly anti-communist force on the border of the Iron Curtain. From 1950 to 1965, the West German economy grew by at least 6% per annum and was a primary export partner of the US during the Korean War.²³

Europe had remained peaceful for two decades, but the support the continent received was tainted by self-serving goals that restricted political freedom, obstructed justice, and put a caveat on peacebuilding that perpetuated throughout the rest of the twentieth century and so far into the twenty-first. While Germany is a nominally successful example of peacebuilding, it is also a cautionary tale for how easily peacebuilding can be tainted with self-serving agendas and how easily those agendas can be covered up through the rhetoric of ensuring peace. The immense power of the United States after WWII gave them plenary bargaining power over a struggling Europe; therefore, peacebuilding proceeded on its terms rather than based on protecting human rights and ensuring justice. In this context, the peacebuilding in Germany – and, to a strikingly similar extent, Japan – was not an unequivocal success. Delegates to the Security Council must understand how peacebuilding can simultaneously successfully prevent conflict but be detrimental to human rights and national sovereignty. Because peacebuilding involves an innate power imbalance – a wealthy, stable nation assisting a region or nation on the brink of violence or total state collapse – international mediators may be a viable way to cut any attached strings to peacebuilding.

Case Studies: Stumbles and Failures

The Graveyard of Empires – Modern-day Afghanistan

When the international community looks to reference a failure in peacebuilding, Afghanistan may be at the top of their list. While the United States had once called its operations in the country “Operation Enduring Freedom,” others coined it as the “Forever War.” Although

²¹ Baars, “Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice?” 175.

²² *The Stars and Stripes*, February 2, 1951.

²³ “West Germany: Woe in the Wirtschaftswunder - TIME,” *Time Magazine*, January 6, 1967, <https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,843206,00.html>.

international organizations have been active in Afghanistan for decades, and a multilateral coalition has as well, there is one country at the forefront of influencing the fate of the country: the United States. The tragic destiny of Afghanistan lies in land and people being used for a geopolitical battle with no winners. The international community continues to debate just why peacebuilding in Afghanistan was unsuccessful. Whether it may be the country's bureaucratic legacies inherited from the Soviet era, the lack of buy-in from the Afghani people to a government largely built by the United States and international actors, or perhaps the continual instability throughout the country whilst peacebuilding was attempted. Regardless, there is a clear timeline during the 21st century, which points to numerous attempts to state build and subsequent failure.

While turmoil throughout Afghanistan stirred for decades, particularly from the 1950s to 1970s, the activity of modern-day state-building truly began in November 2001, following the fall of Kabul due to the Taliban's defeat at the hands of ethnic militias. This leads to a complete destabilization of the country. Soon after, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1378, calling for a "central role" for the United Nations in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery.²⁴ Shortly after, the UN-facilitated peace and stability talks comprised major Afghan factions. This led to the adoption of the Bonn Agreement, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1383, and the installation of an interim administration to head governmental operations in the country. In addition, an international peacekeeping force is deployed to maintain security in Kabul. Lastly, the agreement is followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on December 20, which establishes the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).²⁵

Until 2005, attempts to stabilize Afghan institutions continued with some success. However, the hosting of elections created turmoil throughout the country, with the kidnapping of UN election officials, threats to voters, and claims of election fraud. This only deepens ties between the United States and the fragile Afghan government, as the U.S. gains access to Afghan military facilities and a hand in its judicial system. A year later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) becomes further entrenched into ongoings within Afghanistan, setting goals for years down the line of peace and security, which, of course, would ultimately be unsuccessful.²⁶ In 2010, with a total of over 90,000 United States troops present in Afghanistan, NATO member countries signed a declaration agreeing to hand over full responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. While there is some success in this effort, with ninety-five districts returning to Afghan government control, international involvement in Afghanistan is far from its end.

In the years following what may have appeared as a successful handoff of security operations in Afghanistan and peace talks between the United States, the Afghan government, and the Taliban, there was also the election of President Ashraf Ghani in 2014, who in many circles is seen as a pawn of the United States government. Peace talks become more tense, with concerns from the Afghan government regarding their legitimacy, as well as any hope for a

²⁴ Security Council, "Resolution 1378 (2001)," November 14, 2001, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1378>.

²⁵ "A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan," PBS NewsHour, May 4, 2011, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan>.

²⁶ Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in Riga, "Riga Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2006)," NATO, November 29, 2006, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_37920.htm.

proper solution.²⁷ These peace talks failed after being called off by former United States President Donald Trump. While attempts to salvage progress made take place through talks directly between the Afghan government, the Taliban, and civil society leaders, these ultimately breakdown, and a little over one year later, the United States completely retreated from Afghanistan, leaving the Taliban to swiftly overtake the Afghan government, leading then-President Ghani to flee the country.

The above events are a shallow summary of a decades-long conflict and a wildly unsuccessful attempt to achieve peace and security throughout Afghanistan. The additional attempts by the United States government and other international organizations are not detailed above. This includes work by the United Nations Development Program through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which is still active today.²⁸ In addition, the United States invested over \$88 billion to recruit, train, advise, and equip the Afghan National Security Forces, including Afghan military and police forces, to take over security eventually. Billions were also invested in agricultural and economic development, or even the development of government models utilized by Afghanistan over time. There is an unending list of projects focusing on Afghan stabilization, all of which have been forgotten.

On April 17, 2002, former President George W. Bush delivered a speech in which he stated, “By helping to build an Afghanistan that is free from this evil and is a better place in which to live, we are working in the best traditions of George Marshall” evoking the Marshall Plan.²⁹ While the United States and its allies outspent Marshall Plan-like reconstruction spending in Afghanistan, the involvement of international actors over the years was far more intrusive and left the country more destabilized. While some of the above state-building efforts could have been successful, the vast overreach displayed in others no doubt contributed to its downfall. A lack of agency within any Afghan government led to dependency on the international community, which weakened institutional strength and any hope for faith in institutions from civil society. Because of this, we see today an Afghanistan that is still lost in turmoil and confusion.

Conclusion – Looking Forward

The case studies outlined above contrast one another far beyond the classification of success or failure. Other factors to consider surrounding these case studies, in addition to many other instances of peace and state-building, are rooted in attempts for power. Afghanistan, for example, is in a geopolitically important area and is a state that has never been seated in a position of power within the international community. And while West Germany is geopolitically important, it has held power dissimilar from states within the Global South. Cultural and economic factors are also at play beyond political factors such as this. Homogeneity in one country may allow for less complex peacebuilding, while a culturally heterogeneous civil society leaves significantly more stakeholders to consider. In past instances of peacebuilding, we have seen this ignored. Previous attempts at peacebuilding in the Global South could be considered, from some perspectives, no more than neocolonialism in disguise.

²⁷ James Mackenzie, “Afghan Government Has Concerns about U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal | Reuters,” Reuters, September 4, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1VP166/>.

²⁸ “Activities | UNAMA,” accessed January 25, 2024, <https://unama.unmissions.org/activities>.

²⁹ George W. Bush, “President Outlines War Effort,” George Bush White House Archives, April 17, 2002, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html>.

Meanwhile, as international organizations like the UN embrace the multifaceted and intersectional approaches to development brought on by ever-fastening globalization, there are new methods of peacebuilding that may seem more passive. Initiatives like the Sustainable Development Goals inherently build peace and security, leading to a more secure and prosperous state. The approaches and principles engrained in them should not be ignored when evaluating what can make peacebuilding successful.

The role the international community should play in a state or region's recovery from conflict is central to international relations theory. While academics continue to decipher and debate the best course of action, nations across the world suffer from the relentless cycle of reemerging from conflict only to fall back into violence once a supporting nation or the United Nations turns its back. Some nations have taken it upon themselves to build peace nationally, which may appear to be a more effective way to facilitate progress than facing gridlock in the Security Council and working through the bureaucracy of the UN. As we have seen, however, instances of peacebuilding where nations take it upon themselves to deliver aid – both monetary and otherwise – risk that aid coming with strings attached, thus removing fundamental political and human rights of the nation supposedly being helped. If the Security Council wishes to support nationally-funded peacebuilding, the committee must take steps to ensure that aid is brought to a nation for the sake of the nation, not for the benefits such “investment” may reap in the future.

Additionally, the Security Council has the ability to establish a streamlined international peacebuilding system. In such instances, the UN could ensure that funding is human rights-focused while at the same time working towards making peacebuilding more equitable. As it stands, peacebuilding occurs more commonly in nations in which other nations have a vested interest. A system would create a baseline for the international community's peacebuilding methods. Whether its manifestation is in the form of a resolution, a new organization within the UN, or an international summit, it is possible to lay the groundwork for more equitable, nonpolitical, and thus more effective peacebuilding norms. It is time for the Security Council to learn from peacebuilding's failures, target the common problems, and be the leaders that the UN looks to for guidance.

RESOURCE REVIEW

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992)

The 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace* by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provides an important overview of the United Nations' role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. It outlines specific strategies for conflict prevention through early warning systems, fact-finding missions, mediation, and other means. The report also discusses how the UN can support peacemaking efforts like negotiation, arbitration, and judicial settlement once conflicts have emerged. It further details different types of UN peacekeeping operations and principles for their success, such as consent of the parties involved, neutrality, and non-use of force except in circumstances of self-defense. Delegates can reference this seminal report when emphasizing the need for preventive diplomacy and inclusive peace processes that bring multiple stakeholders to the table.

What is Peacebuilding? Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Van Brabant, 2010)

The 2010 report *What is Peacebuilding? Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* by Koenraad Van Brabant provides a valuable analysis of the concepts of peacebuilding and state-building in post-conflict settings. It outlines critical elements of each process and examines their interrelation. The report notes that peacebuilding involves strengthening the capacity to resolve conflicts nonviolently and transforming relationships after violence, requiring short- and long-term efforts. It also highlights that state-building aims to establish effective governance institutions but does not automatically lead to sustainable peace if exclusion and unresolved grievances persist. The report argues peacebuilding and state-building should complement each other, and focusing too narrowly on building state institutions risks creating further grievances if social and political dynamics are not addressed. Delegates can cite this report to advocate for holistic approaches that integrate peacebuilding and state-building in ways responsive to social needs and grievances.

Evaluating the Legacies of State-Building (Tansey, 2014)

The 2014 journal article *Evaluating the Legacies of State-Building* by Oisín Tansey provides an insightful critique of common standards for evaluating state-building outcomes. It questions if success is often wrongly judged by macro-level indicators like economic growth or democratic elections, which can mask continued instability and violence at local levels. The article argues that lasting peace should be the core metric of success, not just the establishment of institutions that may be detached from people's needs and realities. It also asserts international interveners must be held responsible for the long-term impacts of state-building, not just short-term outputs. Delegates can reference this article to argue for evaluation frameworks prioritizing sustainable peace and meaningful local engagement when assessing state-building efforts.

A Theory of State-Building Success and Failure (Soifer, 2015)

The 2015 book chapter *A Theory of State-Building Success and Failure* by Hillel David Soifer proposes a theory to explain variation in state-building outcomes. It emphasizes the strategies of domestic reformers and their relationships to social forces as crucial factors. The chapter highlights that results depend on institutional designs and how reformers build support among elites and broader society while neutralizing opponents. It notes inclusive reforms tend to succeed, while exclusive, repressive reforms often fail or spark renewed conflict. The chapter also stresses the importance of timing and sequencing reforms

appropriately to the political context. Delegates can cite this theory to advocate for people-centered state-building efforts that include meaningful participation by reform-oriented stakeholders.

Guiding Questions for Debate

- How can your country support marginalized groups from conflict-affected areas, including women, youth, minorities, and civil society actors, in formal peace negotiations and post-conflict decision-making?
- What are other examples of effective or ineffective cases of peacebuilding? What role might your country have played in those efforts that could shape new international standards and best practices?
- How can your country reassess its evaluation criteria for peacebuilding efforts to go beyond state-focused indicators and better capture impacts on sustaining peace locally? What alternative metrics should it consider or promote?
- How can your country use its influence within international organizations and donor coordination platforms to promote greater accountability for long-term peacebuilding outcomes and commitments by external partners? What responsibility is it willing to take on?
- Has your country engaged in peacebuilding within its own borders? What actions has your country taken to strengthen its institutions, perhaps through the Sustainable Development Goals?

Guiding Questions for position paper

- What limitations has your country experienced or observed with existing peacebuilding approaches by international organizations, donors, and non-governmental organizations? How can international norms and frameworks be improved?
- What examples of inclusive, locally-led peacebuilding initiatives can your country highlight from its own history or partnerships that could shape new international standards?
- How has your country evaluated the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts in the past? What alternative metrics focused on sustaining peace and local perspectives, could it propose?
- How has your country participated in global dialogues on peacebuilding, such as through the UN Peacebuilding Commission? What reforms would it recommend for these forums?
- How can your country use diplomatic influence and relationships to encourage international actors to take on long-term commitments and accountability in peacebuilding contexts? What obligations is it willing to shoulder?